Source for file ssh_demo.php
Documentation is available at ssh_demo.php
// $Id: ssh_demo.php,v 1.4 2006/11/16 15:42:08 terrafrost Exp $
// Example of Math_BigInteger's speed. The numbers are obtained by partially negotiating an SSHv1 session with
// shell.sourceforge.net.
// On a 1.6GHz Intel Pentium-M running PHP5, the modular exponentiation took less than a fifth of a second, whereas
// with the BCMath functions, it took a hundreths of a second. That BCMath is faster, however, should come as no
// surprise, given that BCMath has been pre-compiled into assembly and in all likelyhood uses 64-bit integers - something
// that PHP, quite simply, does not support, as yet.
// bcpowmod is included with Math_BigInteger.php via PHP_Compat.
include('../Math_BigInteger.php');
define('SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY',2);
//define('MATH_BIGINTEGER_MODE',MATH_BIGINTEGER_MODE_INTERNAL);
error_reporting(E_STRICT);
// if shell.sourceforge.net doesn't work for you, try another domain name.
ssh1_connect('shell.sourceforge.net',22);
//ssh1_connect('black.cs.utexas.edu',22);
function ssh1_connect($host,$port) {
$identifier = 'SSH-1.5-'.basename(__FILE__);
$fsock = fsockopen($host,$port,$errno,$errstr,10);
die("Error $errno: $errstr");
$init_line = fgets($fsock,255);
if (!preg_match('#SSH-([0-9\.]+)-(.+)#',$init_line,$parts)) {
die('Not an SSH server on the other side.');
die("SSH version {$parts[1]} is not supported!");
echo "Connecting to $init_line\r\n";
fputs($fsock,"$identifier\n");
$packet = get_binary_packet($fsock);
if ($packet['type'] != SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
die('Expected SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY!');
$anti_spoofing_cookie = string_shift($packet['data'],8);
string_shift($packet['data'],4);
$temp = unpack('nlen',string_shift($packet['data'],2));
$server_key_public_exponent = new Math_BigInteger(string_shift($packet['data'],ceil($temp['len'] / 8)),256);
$temp = unpack('nlen',string_shift($packet['data'],2));
$server_key_public_modulus = new Math_BigInteger(string_shift($packet['data'],ceil($temp['len'] / 8)),256);
$temp = unpack('nlen',string_shift($packet['data'],2));
$host_key_public_exponent = new Math_BigInteger(string_shift($packet['data'],ceil($temp['len'] / 8)),256);
$temp = unpack('nlen',string_shift($packet['data'],2));
$host_key_public_modulus = new Math_BigInteger(string_shift($packet['data'],ceil($temp['len'] / 8)),256);
$session_id = pack('H*',md5($host_key_public_modulus.$server_key_public_modulus.$anti_spoofing_cookie));
// ought to use a cryptographically secure random number generator (which mt_srand is not)
list($sec, $usec) = explode(' ', microtime());
mt_srand((float) $sec + ((float) $usec * 100000));
for ($i=0; $i<32; $i++) {
$session_key .= chr(mt_rand(0,255));
$double_encrypted_session_key = $session_key ^ str_pad($session_id,32,chr(0));
if ($server_key_public_modulus->compare($host_key_public_modulus) < 0) {
$prepped_key = prep_session_key($double_encrypted_session_key,$server_key_public_modulus);
$server_key_public_exponent,
$server_key_public_modulus
$server_key_public_exponent,
$server_key_public_modulus
$prepped_key = prep_session_key($double_encrypted_session_key,$host_key_public_modulus);
$host_key_public_exponent,
$host_key_public_exponent,
// see 'The Binary Packet Protocol' section of ssh1-draft.txt for more info.
// also, this function could be improved upon by adding detection for the following exploit:
// http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5LP042K3FY.html
function get_binary_packet($fsock) {
$temp = unpack('Nlen',fread($fsock, 4));
$padding_length = 8 - ($temp['len'] & 7);
$raw = fread($fsock, $temp['len'] + $padding_length);
$padding = substr($raw,0,$padding_length);
$type = $raw{$padding_length};
$data = substr($raw,$padding_length+1,-4);
$temp = unpack('Ncrc',substr($raw,-4));
if ( $temp['crc'] != crc($padding.$type.$data) ) {
die('Bad CRC in packet from server');
function string_shift(&$string, $index = 1) {
$substr = substr($string,0,$index);
$string = substr($string,$index);
// PHP's crc32 function is implemented slightly differently than the one that SSH v1 uses, so
// we've reimplemented it. A more detailed discussion of the differences can be found after
// $crc_lookup_table's initialization.
static $crc_lookup_table = array(
0x00000000, 0x77073096, 0xEE0E612C, 0x990951BA,
0x076DC419, 0x706AF48F, 0xE963A535, 0x9E6495A3,
0x0EDB8832, 0x79DCB8A4, 0xE0D5E91E, 0x97D2D988,
0x09B64C2B, 0x7EB17CBD, 0xE7B82D07, 0x90BF1D91,
0x1DB71064, 0x6AB020F2, 0xF3B97148, 0x84BE41DE,
0x1ADAD47D, 0x6DDDE4EB, 0xF4D4B551, 0x83D385C7,
0x136C9856, 0x646BA8C0, 0xFD62F97A, 0x8A65C9EC,
0x14015C4F, 0x63066CD9, 0xFA0F3D63, 0x8D080DF5,
0x3B6E20C8, 0x4C69105E, 0xD56041E4, 0xA2677172,
0x3C03E4D1, 0x4B04D447, 0xD20D85FD, 0xA50AB56B,
0x35B5A8FA, 0x42B2986C, 0xDBBBC9D6, 0xACBCF940,
0x32D86CE3, 0x45DF5C75, 0xDCD60DCF, 0xABD13D59,
0x26D930AC, 0x51DE003A, 0xC8D75180, 0xBFD06116,
0x21B4F4B5, 0x56B3C423, 0xCFBA9599, 0xB8BDA50F,
0x2802B89E, 0x5F058808, 0xC60CD9B2, 0xB10BE924,
0x2F6F7C87, 0x58684C11, 0xC1611DAB, 0xB6662D3D,
0x76DC4190, 0x01DB7106, 0x98D220BC, 0xEFD5102A,
0x71B18589, 0x06B6B51F, 0x9FBFE4A5, 0xE8B8D433,
0x7807C9A2, 0x0F00F934, 0x9609A88E, 0xE10E9818,
0x7F6A0DBB, 0x086D3D2D, 0x91646C97, 0xE6635C01,
0x6B6B51F4, 0x1C6C6162, 0x856530D8, 0xF262004E,
0x6C0695ED, 0x1B01A57B, 0x8208F4C1, 0xF50FC457,
0x65B0D9C6, 0x12B7E950, 0x8BBEB8EA, 0xFCB9887C,
0x62DD1DDF, 0x15DA2D49, 0x8CD37CF3, 0xFBD44C65,
0x4DB26158, 0x3AB551CE, 0xA3BC0074, 0xD4BB30E2,
0x4ADFA541, 0x3DD895D7, 0xA4D1C46D, 0xD3D6F4FB,
0x4369E96A, 0x346ED9FC, 0xAD678846, 0xDA60B8D0,
0x44042D73, 0x33031DE5, 0xAA0A4C5F, 0xDD0D7CC9,
0x5005713C, 0x270241AA, 0xBE0B1010, 0xC90C2086,
0x5768B525, 0x206F85B3, 0xB966D409, 0xCE61E49F,
0x5EDEF90E, 0x29D9C998, 0xB0D09822, 0xC7D7A8B4,
0x59B33D17, 0x2EB40D81, 0xB7BD5C3B, 0xC0BA6CAD,
0xEDB88320, 0x9ABFB3B6, 0x03B6E20C, 0x74B1D29A,
0xEAD54739, 0x9DD277AF, 0x04DB2615, 0x73DC1683,
0xE3630B12, 0x94643B84, 0x0D6D6A3E, 0x7A6A5AA8,
0xE40ECF0B, 0x9309FF9D, 0x0A00AE27, 0x7D079EB1,
0xF00F9344, 0x8708A3D2, 0x1E01F268, 0x6906C2FE,
0xF762575D, 0x806567CB, 0x196C3671, 0x6E6B06E7,
0xFED41B76, 0x89D32BE0, 0x10DA7A5A, 0x67DD4ACC,
0xF9B9DF6F, 0x8EBEEFF9, 0x17B7BE43, 0x60B08ED5,
0xD6D6A3E8, 0xA1D1937E, 0x38D8C2C4, 0x4FDFF252,
0xD1BB67F1, 0xA6BC5767, 0x3FB506DD, 0x48B2364B,
0xD80D2BDA, 0xAF0A1B4C, 0x36034AF6, 0x41047A60,
0xDF60EFC3, 0xA867DF55, 0x316E8EEF, 0x4669BE79,
0xCB61B38C, 0xBC66831A, 0x256FD2A0, 0x5268E236,
0xCC0C7795, 0xBB0B4703, 0x220216B9, 0x5505262F,
0xC5BA3BBE, 0xB2BD0B28, 0x2BB45A92, 0x5CB36A04,
0xC2D7FFA7, 0xB5D0CF31, 0x2CD99E8B, 0x5BDEAE1D,
0x9B64C2B0, 0xEC63F226, 0x756AA39C, 0x026D930A,
0x9C0906A9, 0xEB0E363F, 0x72076785, 0x05005713,
0x95BF4A82, 0xE2B87A14, 0x7BB12BAE, 0x0CB61B38,
0x92D28E9B, 0xE5D5BE0D, 0x7CDCEFB7, 0x0BDBDF21,
0x86D3D2D4, 0xF1D4E242, 0x68DDB3F8, 0x1FDA836E,
0x81BE16CD, 0xF6B9265B, 0x6FB077E1, 0x18B74777,
0x88085AE6, 0xFF0F6A70, 0x66063BCA, 0x11010B5C,
0x8F659EFF, 0xF862AE69, 0x616BFFD3, 0x166CCF45,
0xA00AE278, 0xD70DD2EE, 0x4E048354, 0x3903B3C2,
0xA7672661, 0xD06016F7, 0x4969474D, 0x3E6E77DB,
0xAED16A4A, 0xD9D65ADC, 0x40DF0B66, 0x37D83BF0,
0xA9BCAE53, 0xDEBB9EC5, 0x47B2CF7F, 0x30B5FFE9,
0xBDBDF21C, 0xCABAC28A, 0x53B39330, 0x24B4A3A6,
0xBAD03605, 0xCDD70693, 0x54DE5729, 0x23D967BF,
0xB3667A2E, 0xC4614AB8, 0x5D681B02, 0x2A6F2B94,
0xB40BBE37, 0xC30C8EA1, 0x5A05DF1B, 0x2D02EF8D
// For this function to yield the same output as PHP's crc32 function, $crc would have to be
// set to 0xFFFFFFFF, initially - not 0x00000000 as it currently is.
for ($i=0;$i<$length;$i++) {
// We AND $crc >> 8 with 0x00FFFFFF because we want the eight newly added bits to all
// be zero. PHP, unfortunately, doesn't always do this. 0x80000000 >> 8, as an example,
// yields 0xFF800000 - not 0x00800000. The following link elaborates:
// http://www.php.net/manual/en/language.operators.bitwise.php#57281
$crc = (($crc >> 8) & 0x00FFFFFF) ^ $crc_lookup_table[($crc & 0xFF) ^ ord($text{$i})];
// In addition to having to set $crc to 0xFFFFFFFF, initially, the return value must be XOR'd with
// 0xFFFFFFFF for this function to return the same thing that PHP's crc32 function would.
function prep_session_key($session_key,$modulus) {
$modulus = $modulus->toBytes();
$length = strlen($modulus)-strlen($session_key)-3;
for ($i=0; $i<$length; $i++) {
$result .= chr(mt_rand(1,255));
$result .= chr(0).$session_key;
return new Math_BigInteger($result,256);
// returns mod(pow($m,$e),$n), where $n should be the product of two (large) primes $p and $q and where $e
// should be a number with the property that gcd($e,($p-1)*($q-1)) == 1. could just make anything that
// calls this call modexp, instead, but I think this makes things clearer, maybe...
function rsa_crypt($m, $key) {
echo "\r\nRSA with Math_BigInteger\r\n\r\n(".$m->toString().' ^ '.$key[0]->toString().') % '.$key[1]->toString()."\r\n\r\n";
$start = microtime_float();
$temp = $m->modPow($key[0],$key[1]);
$end = microtime_float()-$start;
echo "\r\n\r\nElapsed Time == $end\r\n";
function rsa_crypt2($m, $key) {
$m = bytes2bcint($m->toBytes());
$key[0] = bytes2bcint($key[0]->toBytes());
$key[1] = bytes2bcint($key[1]->toBytes());
echo "\r\nRSA with BCMath\r\n\r\n($m ^ {$key[0]}) % {$key[1]}\r\n\r\n";
$start = microtime_float();
$temp = bcpowmod($m,$key[0],$key[1],0);
$end = microtime_float()-$start;
echo "\r\n\r\nElapsed Time == $end\r\n";
function bytes2bcint($x) {
$len+= (3*$len)%4; // rounds $len to the nearest 4.
$x = str_pad($x,$len,chr(0),STR_PAD_LEFT);
for ($i=0;$i<$len;$i+=4) {
$value = bcmul($value,4294967296); // 4294967296 == 2**32
$value = bcadd($value,0x1000000*ord($x{$i}) + ((ord($x{$i+1})<<16) | (ord($x{$i+2})<<8) | ord($x{$i+3})));
function bcint2bytes($x) {
while (bccomp($x,0) > 0) {
$temp = bcmod($x,4294967296);
$value = chr(floor($temp/0x1000000)).chr($temp >> 16).chr($temp >> 8).chr($temp).$value;
$x = bcdiv($x,4294967296);
return ltrim($value,chr(0));
function microtime_float() {
list($usec, $sec) = explode(' ', microtime());
return ((float)$usec + (float)$sec);
Documentation generated on Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:48:48 -0400 by phpDocumentor 1.4.4. PEAR Logo Copyright © PHP Group 2004.
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